Rashideen convoy (Fua and Kafraya evacuees) bombing – another angle

After the suicide truck bombing of a convoy of waiting buses full of residents from Fua and Kafraya in the rebel-held western Aleppo suburb/outskirt of Rashideen, western mass media hurried to ignore some facts and twist and obfuscate others in order to deflect the rightful blame from the mostly Al Qaeda affiliated rebels.

One „fact“ which was not one according to veteran war reporter and Middle East conflict expert Elijah Magnier was the rebel claim reported and spread by BBC that the suicide vehicle could not have entered Rashideen without (Syrian) government permission, implying that the government (that – unlike the rebels – has never used suicide bombs as weapon) bombed the pro-government victims. In fact, however, the truck driver who blew himself up did NOT come from the government direction AND it is impossible he could have entered that area without being checked by rebels or having at least passed their checkpoints.

Another „proof“ for the rebels innocence was the oppositions pointing to the circumstance that some rebels guarding the convoy died as well.
Assuming this to be true, it does neither prove the rebels innocence nor the governments guilt, however, it clearly shows that the rebels consisting of so many different factions, even different degrees of radicalism within their most radical jihadi factions (former Al Nusra, now HTS; Ahrar al Sham, Jaish al Islam..) cannot control and contain their own forces and thus are highly unreliable as negotiation and deal partners.
While it is indeed very unlikely that Ahrar or al Nusra (HTS) killed their own fighters as deliberate „collateral damage“ of the massacre of Shia children, it is an absolutely realistic scenario that a 3rd party such as Jund al Aqsa, which could have disagreed with letting the „Shia apostates“ go decided to kill as many as possible Fua and Kafraya residents.

This latter aspect of the terror attack is something the almost entirely anti-Assad mass media choose to ignore, because it highlights a dilemma of Syrias opposition at which Assad and his government correctly point since years: There is no unified opposition with a clear, respected and powerful leadership. There is no opposition leadership that could negotiate with the Syrian government, give promises and have the capability to reliably control and enforce the implementation of the mutual agreement.
Why should the Syrian government attend negotiation meetings when the opposition participants are exiles who can exert no power on the field commanders and fighters involved in the daily fighting against the government?


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