Why is Iran supporting Hezbollah?

Many Iranians are complaining about Iran helping Hezbollah in Lebanon, often emphasizing that there are enough poor and needy people in Iran more worthy of support.

While it´s true that there are indeed many poor people in Iran, we should keep in mind that Irans financial problems are not due to money „wasted“ on funding Hezbollah but mainly to – largely unjustified –  western sanctions. Irans loss from being disconnected from the international payment system and from the extreme sanction based decline of foreign direct investments is in the tens of Billions.

Hezbollah is Irans extended front line with Israel. Without this „artificial border“ Iran would not be able to deter Israel from attacking Iranian facilities by making use of US provided long range bombers.

Thus, when the civil war in Syria broke out and took a clearly sectarian tone by attracting foreign Shia- and Iran-hating Jihadists, both Iran and Hezbollah understood the existential threat. It was no coincidence that Israel immediately supported the „rebellion“ in Syria (while at the same time treating stonethrowing Palestinian youth as „terrorists“).
Irans support for the Syrian government is neither because of the former being led by an Alawite (often wrongly called a „Shia sect“) nor with the purpose of expanding Shia Islam or suppressing Sunnis. If Irans motivations were „sectarian“ then why did the country support Sunni Afghans (Massouds Northern Alliance) and Arabs (Hamas)? Why the support for Sunni Europeans (Bosnians) in the Balcan wars?
Irans support for Syria has three main reasons:
1. During the Iran-Iraq war Syria supported Iran, while all Arab middle east and Gulf states supported Iraq with money and arms, sometimes even with fighters.
2. Syria shares a border with Israel and constitutes another remote front line for Iran in case of a war with Israel.
3. Syria is the only land route to Southern Lebanon. Without an Iran friendly government in Damascus Hezbollah would not last long in any conflict.

The departure of the Syrian army from Lebanon in 2005 marked the rise of Salafi militants in that country. These forces have at times not only attacked Hezbollah but also engaged the Lebanese army.
As early as in the first months of the start of the Syrian war Salafi militants from Lebanon were intruding Syria and attacking the police and armed forces.

Iranian military strategists recognized the threat immediately: A sectarian insurgency enjoying the support of western powers, Israel, Turkey and the Gulf States, getting arms, funds, equipment and training from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and the CIA while being romanticized and whitewashed by western and arab mainstream media would overpower the Syrian government. It was only a question of time.

As predictable as the pending fall of the Syrian ally was, it was also clear that the various backers of the insurgency shared one motivation: hatred of Iran and – as far as the Gulf states were concerned  – the Shia.
Iran could not afford to wait and see waves of foreign Jihadis arrive in Syria to not only „liberate“ the country from the „Nusayri infidels“ (derogatory term for Alawites) but in a further step move on to defeat the „Rafidhi“ (derogatory term for Shias) Hezbollah nearby in Lebanon.

What would happen next?
Since 2003 Iraq has been experiencing years of relentless bombings and massacres against the Shia majority (mostly civilians and including Sunnis living among Shias) carried out by radical islamists, many of them Arabs from Gulf countries. To make things worse Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), presumed dead, resurfaced as ISIS and intensified devastating terror attacks and warfare both in Syria and Iraq.
It was not far fetched to assume that after defeating the Syrian army and Hezbollah Syrias sectarian insurgency  would export the emerging „caliphate“ to Iraq to fight and defeat the Shia government. Despite the Shia making up some 70-75% of the Arab Iraqis the fall of the formally Sunni Saddam government was a thorn in Saudi Arabias eyes and continues to be hardly acceptable even 14 years later.

Iran had and has no interest in having hordes of sectarian „Majoos“ (derogatory term for Iranians used by Arabs) hating islamists on its borders. The decision to dispatch Hezbollah to the Syrian battlefields was nothing but the correct anticipation of an upcoming deadly menace to Irans security and territorial integrity.
In Syria Hezbollah continues to suffer casualties but has managed to contribute heavily to the survival of the government and the rolling back of the jihadists. Hezbollah engaged and defeated both Al Qaeda and Isis in Lebanon as well as on Syrian battle fronts. Without Hezbollah fighting Isis near the Iraqi border in eastern Syria the Iraqi army would have a much harder time defeating Isis in Mossul.

Hezbollahs proven capabilities in assymetrical warfare are a major reason why so far Israel has refrained from attacking Iran.
Plus, as mentioned, Hezbollah managed to severely weaken the anti-Iranian, predominantly Salafi insurgency in Syria and choke off any domino effects leading to the reestablishment of an anti-Iranian government in Iraq.

Already Syrias „moderate“ rebels work with al-Nusra and are almost aligning with IS

It speaks volumes:
Obama, Kerry and their willing central European co-warmongers still claim there are moderate Syrian rebels. Then they display either total ignorance or naivety by further claiming that these hardly identifiable moderates deserve to get (more) American weapons because they are supposed to do the ground fighting against the „Islamic State“.
The more interesting then that these rebels already are announcing openly that they are signing truces („non-aggression“ pacts) with IS in order to focus on their common agenda: „the Nussayri regime“ (Nussayri is a perjorative term for the Syrian Alawites. Calling the government „Nussayri“ not only proves the sectarianism of the rebels including the „moderates“ but also shows that they ignore that major parts of the government and the armed forces are in fact Sunnis).

Once again it is proven that alleged moderates (like the Syrian Revolutionary Front) closely work with the Al-Nusra Front, while the latter openly cooperates with IS on several fronts, e.g. Lebanon.

What? Syrian refugees want to vote FOR Bashar???

After 2-3 years of constantly hearing and reading biased and polemic anti-Assad reporting and comments in the media of their host countries you could expect the broad majority of Syrian refugees to either abstain from voting or use the event to express their opposition to Assad by explicitly voting for another candidate.
Instead it seems that quite a many refuguees appeared at the voting stations to vote for Assad:

The massive turnout for the expatriate Syrian vote at the embassy above Beirut produced scenes rarely observed at any embassy or polling station in the world.

At times it turned into a rowdy support rally for the incumbent Bashar al-Assad, with none of the normal election decorum…

The strength and assertiveness of the vote may have reflected an underlying feeling among many Syrians abroad that the tide is running in the regime’s favour, and it is time to climb aboard.

Bombings in Lebanon and the hypocrisy of western media

Whenever a bomb detonates in a Shia area of Lebanon western press is quick to call the place an „Hezbollah stronghold“ and explain/justify the perpetartors malicious action by stating that this was a reaction to Hezbollah fighting alongside the Syrian army.

Thus an indiscriminate act of terror by entirely sectarian motivated perpetrators is almost whitewashed as just an exotic version of the war against (alleged) Iranian terror since Hezbollah is affiliated with the Iranian regime.

In the most recent case the bombers detonated their deadly cargo near to an orphanage and hurt Children:

…but maybe these victims are also Assads „Shabiha“ and targetting them just another chapter in the very creative art of „freedom fighting“



The Takfiris are leading the Middle East into a disaster

„Just as after Hariri’s killing, the calculated recriminations of the March 14 coalition, led by the Future Movement, came fast and furious. Blame was laid squarely at the feet of Hezbollah…As with all political upheavals in Lebanon, the question that must be asked is, “who benefits?” Does Hezbollah? Although Shatah was a stalwart March 14 operative who decried Hezbollah’s role in Syria, he was nevertheless regarded as a relative moderate…Just as in Iraq, moderate Sunni politicians have been singled out for assassination by takfiris who seek to exploit their spilled blood, provoke co-religionists into committing crimes against civilians and stir a simmering sectarian pot. Who are the likely perpetrators behind Mohammed Shatah’s assassination and the dahiyeh bombing? The very same ones the U.S. and Saudi-backed March 14 coalition have emboldened.“


The biggest threat to the world of Islam are EXTREMIST (Takfiri) Sunnis

The statements in this article are not relating to or directed against mainstream Sunnis, be they  „moderate/secular“ or conservatively pious.
I am specifically speaking of the „Takfeeris“, those who declare other muslims, especially non-Sunni muslims or nonconforming moderate Sunni muslims Unbelievers (Kuffar). The next step which the Takfeeris call for and actively work on – be it through arming and funding Jihadis or going to „Jihad“ themselves – is the extermination of the „Unbelievers“.

The broad majority of Takfeeris belong to the Wahhabi/Salafi school of thought , which itself is a part of the minority school of Hanbalis within Sunni Islam. The problem, however, is that this radical ideology is widespread among both private and political circles of the Arab monarchies of the southern Persian Gulf, which the West cannot really afford to antagnoize and punish because
a) they are (among) the most important global suppliers of petroleum and natural gas
b) they are harbouring US military forces
c) they are (especially Saudi Arabia) very important buyers of western weapons
d) they have bought themselves into western companies and economies
e) they are hostile to Iran
f) they have deposited hundreds of billions of USD in american banks, which if transferred elsewhere could cause a massive economic crash for the US.

The article below written by awarded expert journalist Patrick Cockburn highlights the irresponsible behaviour of the Gulf monarchies and the dangers that are threatening the Shia people:


Homs: The massacre that did NOT take place

Sarkozy once pressed for an intervention in Syria when „Assads army“ was pounding the rebel-held Baba Amr district. Sarkozy warned that unless the „international community“ intervenes (militarily) Assad would commit a massacre just as Gaddafi would have done in Benghazi if Nato had not attacked his forces.
Now, warning of a massacre by pointing to a massacre that never occurred is itself ridiculous, but those who have followed the utterances of the likes of Bush, Blair, Sarkozy and co. since the Iraq war (2003) at latest are used to brazen lies and bizarre comparisons.

Now, it seems that the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), Syrias regular army – which contrary to incorrect mainstream media reports – is predominantly Sunni (including many high ranking commanders such as the defense minister) is „making  key gains in Homs“:

Homs was given the title „Heart of the revolution“. It is Syrias 3rd largest city with a population between 600.000 and 1,2 million people, predominantly Sunni.
Taking into account these facts and assuming as a „fact“ the rebels claim that they represent the (will of the) majority of (especially Sunni) Syrians, one could (and should) expect two things to happen:
a) (almost) the whole population should rise up in support of the rebels and push back the army, if not even inflict heavy casualties on it
b) the allegedly sectarian SAA will commit against the „civilian population“ the massacre it did NOT commit in February 2012 when it retook Baba Amr

Instead rebel spokesmen are lamenting the purported participation of Hezbollah fighters on the side of the SAA as a major reason for the latters strength. Why and how should a few hundred to few thousand Hezbollah fighters matter when the rebels not only themselves are relying (increasingly) on all kind of arab and non-arab „foreign combatants“ but also supposedly enjoy the backing of Homs´Sunni majority?