Who is suddenly and successfully fighting ISIS in Syria?

Out of the sudden and within few days the notorious Syrian-Iraqi Al Qaeda affiliate „ISIS“ (Islam State of Iraq and Sham) is suffering defeat after defeat on several fronts within Syria. But who is really fighting them?
We are now to believe that a hitherto hardly known group called „Army of Mujahideen“ is taking the lead in the inner-rebel „Jihad“ of (supposedly) „moderate“ rebels vs. ISIS:

It is hard to conceive that the much feared and battle-experienced ISIS militia that has been simultaneously fighting the regular Syrian Army (SAA), the pro-regime NDF militia, the Kurds from YPG and different other rebel factions in Idlib, Aleppo, Hama and Raqqa is suddenly overpowered by the spontaneously created „Army of Mujahideen“.
What is more interesting is a concerted campaign by mass media outlets to portray the new player as part as the FSA, which has been a cover name for the so called „moderate“ rebels.  So, just as the rebellion lost the last bits of its once hyped aura of romantization and it became clear that the relevant forces on the rebel side are the most radical Salafi Jihadists – Syrian or otherwise – the old „good cop bad cop“ scheme is being applied: „Folks, there ARE the good, moderate rebels and they ARE militarily relevant. Look, they are routing Al Qaeda. Failing to praise and support them is tantamount to strengthening Al Qaeda“.

To look through this new attempt of deception through smoke screen creation it is necessary to read between the lines, e.g. this article where „FSA“ rebels are quoted openly admitting that their successes on the southern Deraa battlefront are mostly owed to the Nusra front (JN), the other Al Qaeda affiliate operating on the Syrian soil:

The biggest rebel umbrella organization aside from „Al Qaeda“ (JN & ISIS) is the newly formed „Islamic Front“ (IF) with its alleged 50-60.000 fighters, so if the claim is to be made that these other rebels follow a clearly different and non-islamist/non-sectarian „moderate“ ideology then one should ask whether the IF has openly declared ISIS (and JN) as enemy.
This is unlikely as only few weeks ago the IF and ISIS/JN were conducting joint operations: ISIS/JN played the main role in the capture of the Mingh airbase, in the capture of the al-Kindi hospital and in the attack and ensuing sectarian killings in Adraa near Damascus:

There are clear indications that the entire „sensational“ story about the supposed „uprising“ of moderate Syrian rebels against the evil, mostly non-Syrian „Al Qaeda“ rebels is a masquerade to wash the insurgency clean of its worst stains, but this is probably a bluff. It seems that ISIS is not putting up any real resistance and is also not suffering high casualties. Where are for instance the much feared Chechen fighters? Is it possible that the majority of ISIS fighters are only changing the label by „defecting“ to JN or the Islamic Front?

The following blog article is very well researched and outlines the depth of the farce that is spread through western and rebel friendly media:

Predictably we will hear in the course of the next couple of weeks that the ISIS-held rebel areas are „liberated“ by „moderate“ rebels, which in turn will be once again portrayed as reform-minded, pro-western, democracy interested non-sectarian majority that is fighting an oppressive dictatorship.
My two cents.

The Takfiris are leading the Middle East into a disaster

„Just as after Hariri’s killing, the calculated recriminations of the March 14 coalition, led by the Future Movement, came fast and furious. Blame was laid squarely at the feet of Hezbollah…As with all political upheavals in Lebanon, the question that must be asked is, “who benefits?” Does Hezbollah? Although Shatah was a stalwart March 14 operative who decried Hezbollah’s role in Syria, he was nevertheless regarded as a relative moderate…Just as in Iraq, moderate Sunni politicians have been singled out for assassination by takfiris who seek to exploit their spilled blood, provoke co-religionists into committing crimes against civilians and stir a simmering sectarian pot. Who are the likely perpetrators behind Mohammed Shatah’s assassination and the dahiyeh bombing? The very same ones the U.S. and Saudi-backed March 14 coalition have emboldened.“


The biggest threat to the world of Islam are EXTREMIST (Takfiri) Sunnis

The statements in this article are not relating to or directed against mainstream Sunnis, be they  „moderate/secular“ or conservatively pious.
I am specifically speaking of the „Takfeeris“, those who declare other muslims, especially non-Sunni muslims or nonconforming moderate Sunni muslims Unbelievers (Kuffar). The next step which the Takfeeris call for and actively work on – be it through arming and funding Jihadis or going to „Jihad“ themselves – is the extermination of the „Unbelievers“.

The broad majority of Takfeeris belong to the Wahhabi/Salafi school of thought , which itself is a part of the minority school of Hanbalis within Sunni Islam. The problem, however, is that this radical ideology is widespread among both private and political circles of the Arab monarchies of the southern Persian Gulf, which the West cannot really afford to antagnoize and punish because
a) they are (among) the most important global suppliers of petroleum and natural gas
b) they are harbouring US military forces
c) they are (especially Saudi Arabia) very important buyers of western weapons
d) they have bought themselves into western companies and economies
e) they are hostile to Iran
f) they have deposited hundreds of billions of USD in american banks, which if transferred elsewhere could cause a massive economic crash for the US.

The article below written by awarded expert journalist Patrick Cockburn highlights the irresponsible behaviour of the Gulf monarchies and the dangers that are threatening the Shia people:


Iraqi Sunnis‘ long struggle since Saddam

The article below is well investigated and describes a sad timeline of the disappointment and (justified) anger of many Iraqi Sunnis regarding the Maliki government.


„Sunnis joined the first government of Nouri Maliki, but the influential posts went to Shia or Kurdish politicians and Sunni complaints of marginalisation continued…In 2007, while Iraq was sliding towards unprecedented levels of sectarian violence, Sunnis joined other secular and Shia parties and withdrew from Mr Maliki’s government in an attempt to bring him down…The gradual defeat of al-Qaeda – which turned out not to have been decisive – and the crackdown on Shia militias gave Mr Maliki significant political credibility and Sunnis rejoined his government…In the election of 2010, and apparently after understanding that they would not dominate power in the country again, almost all Sunni influential parties joined the Iraqiya bloc led by the secular Shia politician Iyad Allawi…“